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The Promise and Perils of Conscience
Steven D. Smith∗
I. INTRODUCTION
My assignment is to comment on a paper by Professor Rodney
Smith1 about conscience, and also to try to tie this specific subject into
the conference’s overall theme: LDS Perspectives on Law. At first
glance, this seems not to be an easy assignment. Oliver Cowdery and
section 134 of the Doctrine & Covenants2 made some important
statements about conscience, but those statements also seem to be quite
general⎯almost platitudinous, we might think⎯so they do not in any
explicit way address the more specific questions about conscience that
lawyers and courts confront today.3 In addition, I understand Professor
Smith’s conclusion to be that, except in some details, Oliver Cowdery’s
views on conscience were approximately the same as those that James
Madison had expressed half a century earlier,4 and, we might add, that

∗ Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. It was a pleasure to
participate in the LDS Perspectives on Law Conference, held at Brigham Young University on
October 19, 2001, and an honor to be able to comment on Rodney Smith’s paper, and to do so with
Fred Gedicks, Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University. I
have counted Rod and Fred as good friends for many years, and have admired how, in different
ways, they have thoughtfully integrated LDS perspectives into their scholarship.
The views expressed in this Comment do not necessarily reflect the views of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the Brigham Young University
Law Review.
1. Rodney K. Smith, James Madison, John Witherspoon, and Oliver Cowdery: The First
Amendment and the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants, 2003 BYU L. REV. 891. Rodney
K. Smith is Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of
Memphis.
2. The Doctrine & Covenants is part of the canon of scripture of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints.
3. Some of the more specific questions of conscience relevant to lawyers and courts are
thoughtfully discussed by Professor Rodney Smith in his other writings on this subject. See, e.g.,
Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little
“Conscience”, 1996 BYU L. REV. 645; Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion, and the
Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of the End to the Wandering of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917 (1993).
4. See Smith, supra note 1, at 934–40 (noting that Cowdery’s views are quite similar to
those of Madison).
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were common in Protestant America. Indeed, a quotation from Joseph
Fielding Smith that Professor Smith repeats suggests that this may have
been the whole point of section 134, that is, to assure fellow citizens that
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints were not
idiosyncratic, or at least not subversive, but rather held essentially the
same views on conscience, religious freedom, and church-state
separation that most other Americans held.5
How then can these early Latter-day Saints’ views on conscience
provide a distinctive LDS perspective on law? I want to offer, in
summary form, two responses to that question. First, a commitment to
conscience imports a conception of the person that is crucial but sorely
missing in today’s legal discourse. Second, LDS experience gives Latterday Saints a distinctive perspective from which to appreciate the dangers
of conscience. The first point, discussed in Part II of this Comment,
suggests the contribution of an appreciation of conscience in the
unbelieving neighborhoods of the world.6 The second point, discussed in
Part III of this Comment, suggests the possibility of an overappreciation
of conscience that has sometimes been a hazard in what we might call

5. See id. at 929 n.139. The quotation is as follows:
The reason for the article on “Government and Laws in General,” is explained in the fact
that the Latter-day Saints had been accused by their bitter enemies, both in Missouri and
in other places, as being opposed to law and order. They had been portrayed as setting up
laws in conflict with the laws of the country. This bitterness went so far that an
accusation was brought against them, on one occasion in a Missouri court, of disloyalty
because they believed that at some future time the Lord would set up his own kingdom
which would supersede the government of the United States, and so believing that the
time would come when such a kingdom would be established, they were disloyal to the
United States. Every pretext that could be imagined against the Saints to try to show them
disloyal and rebellious against established government, was brought into use.
2 JOSEPH FIELDING SMITH, CHURCH HISTORY AND MODERN REVELATION 30–31 (1953).
6. See generally Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious
Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1078−79
(1996). Professor Laycock states,
I have heard several colleagues say that religious claims are absurd, ridiculous, irrational,
or unworthy of respect. I have never heard a colleague, at any of the three law schools
where I have taught, make a religious claim in an academic context. When the student
chapter of the Christian Legal Society at The University of Texas needed a speaker, I
knew of only three or four church-attending colleagues on a faculty of sixty-five, none in
the evangelical mode the students were seeking.
Id. For recent expressions of this assessment of contemporary culture, see HUSTON SMITH, WHY
RELIGION MATTERS: THE FATE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT IN AN AGE OF DISBELIEF (2001); GREGG
EASTERBROOK, BESIDE STILL WATERS: SEARCHING FOR MEANING IN AN AGE OF DOUBT (1999).
But see PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY (2002).
Obviously, no simple description can do justice to the complex reality.
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the believing world. Oliver Cowdery might serve, in part tragically, as a
sort of living illustration of both points.
II. CONSCIENCE AND THE BELIEVING PERSON
To introduce the first point that a commitment to conscience imports
a crucial conception of the person that is missing in legal discourse, let
me start with an observation that Lon Fuller made several decades ago.
Though we may often fail to notice the fact, Fuller explained that legal
discourse implicitly contains some conception of the person, some image
of what a person is.7 Accepting Fuller’s insight, I would say that legal
discourse today is pervaded by two principal images of the person: first,
the person as interest seeker and second, the person as autonomous
agent (or perhaps the person as chooser). We might say that the first
kind of person⎯the person whose essence and purpose is to maximize
his interests⎯is a latter-day descendant of the Tribe of Bentham. The
second person, whose essential, defining feature is autonomy, descends
from the lineage of the Tribe of Kant. The first image has solid
contemporary support in the sciences and social sciences⎯in
evolutionary psychology and economics, for instance⎯while the second
image is entirely orthodox in the liberal political and moral tradition
represented today by prominent thinkers such as Raz, Dworkin, and
Rawls.
In short, both conceptions of the person have impressive credentials,
and I readily concede that both conceptions capture important aspects of
what it means to be a person: we do have interests and we do make
choices. However, both images also have severe limitations. In the area
of religious freedom, for instance, the interest-seeking person and the
autonomous person seem a bit awkward or out of place. We quickly
recognize something incongruous, almost grotesque, in the occasional
attempt to understand religion or religious freedom primarily in
economic or interest-seeking terms. And we also know that attempts to
collapse religion into autonomous choice do violence to the very nature
of believing and believers. We need not go to the other extreme⎯to
7. Specifically, Fuller was worried about what he viewed as the pernicious effects on law of
a conception of the nature of man taken over from the behavioral sciences. He contended that many
legal thinkers of his time had adopted a Skinnerian view that saw the person as a helpless victim of
outside forces. Fuller believed that this depiction was undermining the efficacy of law, which
necessarily depends on “the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of
understanding and following rules, and answerable for defaults.” LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 162 (rev. ed. 1969).
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Schleiermacher’s view that “[t]he essence of religion consists in the
feeling of an absolute dependence”8⎯to realize that religion does not
primarily consist in our autonomous choices about how to achieve selfrealization.
I believe that Professor Smith captures this point well in James
Madison, John Witherspoon, and Oliver Cowdery: The First Amendment
and the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants when he explains,
with support from Gordon B. Hinckley, president of the LDS Church, as
well as from his own experience, that conscience is based not on choice
so much as on duty, or even a kind of compulsion.9 The classic
expression was Martin Luther’s: “Here I stand; I can do no other.”10
The unsuitability of the prevailing conceptions of the person for
some areas of law reflects a deeper deficiency, I believe: standing alone,
those conceptions simply do not capture the distinctive character of
human beings. They do not explain what it is that leads us to say that
persons are inviolable, or sacred, or perhaps infinitely precious. They
miss what lies behind the claim that human beings are made “in the
image of God.”11 In that respect, the standard conceptions, despite their
limited truth, serve to obscure what it is that makes us interested in such
things as human rights or constitutional rights. A Vatican II document
puts the point this way: “[W]ithout the Creator the creature would
disappear. For their part, . . . all believers of whatever religion have
always heard His revealing voice in the discourse of creatures. But when
God is forgotten the creature itself grows unintelligible.”12
“Unintelligible,” of course, is the sort of adjective often used to describe
the modern jurisprudence of religious freedom. There is not time here to
elaborate on the connection, but I suspect that it is quite real.13
One of the virtues of talking about conscience, I believe, is that
conscience is a notion that still has considerable resonance with
people⎯even academics⎯of a variety of religious and secular
persuasions, and it is also a way of challenging the prevailing
8. Quoted in WILLIAM P. ALSTON, RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 3
(1963).
9. See Smith, supra note 1, at 936–37 & n.156.
10. Whether Luther uttered the exact words that have come down in legend is doubtful, see
OWEN CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION 56 (1964), but they capture the essence of his statement.
11. Genesis 1:27.
12. Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World] § 36, in
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 234 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966) (emphasis added).
13. I try to develop this thesis in a more sustained way in Believing Persons, Personal
Believings: The Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233.
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conceptions of the person as interest seeker or as autonomous agent. Of
course, many academics today do not understand conscience in anything
like the way that James Madison and Oliver Cowdery did. Marie
Failinger has observed that “[w]hat began as an argument that
government must ensure a free response by the individual called
distinctively by the Divine . . . has, in modern-day cases, become an
argument for the protection of human autonomy.”14 As a result, “[w]hile
the word ‘conscience’ is still used, it has come to mean very little beyond
the notion of personal existential decision-making.”15 Still, any close
examination of the notion of conscience will show, I think, that
conscience cannot be reduced either to mere interest seeking or to
autonomous choice.16
In short, commonly held commitments to conscience do not square
well with the conceptions of the person as interest seeker or the person as
autonomous agent. An understanding of conscience⎯even in its modern,
nontheistic versions⎯pushes us to recognize a different conception, or
what I would call the “person as believer.”17 This conception is not only
evident in founding documents like the Declaration of Independence
(with its “We hold these truths . . . .”), but also in the first words of
Christian creeds: the “I believe” of the Apostles’ Creed, and the “We
believe” of the Nicene Creed and of the LDS Articles of Faith. The
continuing prestige of conscience provides an opening, I think, to
introduce the believing person back into legal discourse.
If that introduction could succeed, we might then be able to take the
next steps to ask, Why is “believing” such a crucial part of what it is to
be a person, and in what does the believing person believe? Conceivably,
those questions might eventually lead to a recognition of the person as a
creature or, as LDS Church members would say, a child of God.
LDS scholars are not alone in taking these questions seriously, of
course, nor are we alone in professing a commitment to a religious
understanding of conscience. Indeed, though it would be hard to quantify
the point, my own sense (based mostly in recent years, I admit, on
14. Marie A. Failinger, Wondering after Babel: Power, Freedom and Ideology in US
Supreme Court Interpretations of the Religion Clauses, in LAW AND RELIGION 81, 93 (Rex J. Ahdar
ed., 2000).
15. Id. at 94.
16. Thus, scholars like David and Susan Williams have persuasively shown that voluntarist
accounts do not capture much of what religion and conscience have meant in our American religious
history. See David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991).
17. See supra note 13.
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attendance at sacrament meetings and Primary meetings18) is that today
Latter-day Saints talk about conscience less than some other Christian
traditions do,19 and there are probably reasons for this, one of which I
will notice shortly in Part III. Still, there seems to be no hesitation in
affirming the ideas of section 134 of the Doctrine & Covenants.
Moreover, our understanding of conscience in the terms used by people
like James Madison and Oliver Cowdery may help us to address the
underlying questions about what makes us persons, and about what
makes persons distinctively valuable.
To put the point differently, what Oliver Cowdery said about
conscience may have been largely platitudinous in his time, but it is not
in ours. LDS Church members still believe what our ancestors said about
conscience⎯and, even more importantly, we believe what those
statements presuppose about God and ourselves⎯when much of the rest
of the academic world does not. Our counter-cultural stance in this
respect may support not a unique perspective, perhaps, but at least a
distinctive, and distinctively valuable, contribution to legal thought.
III. THE DARK SIDE OF CONSCIENCE
Along with Oliver Cowdery and James Madison, LDS Church
members celebrate conscience, but beneath our celebration we also
understand that conscience, like fire, is both a blessing and a threat. Talk
of conscience is typically calculated to emphasize that saving and dutyimposing belief resides in the individual. Claims of conscience often
have a “Declaration of Independence” quality to them: they are asserted
for the purpose of freeing the individual, to some extent, from the
constraints of the community or from collective authority.
In many situations, the collective authority from which the individual
seeks a measure of independence is the state or the government; in many
other situations, it is the church. Historically, the Protestant emphasis on
conscience was in large part calculated to show the ostensible errors of
Catholic Christianity, which asserted the necessity of the church in
teaching individuals what to believe and how to live. Catholic teaching
18. The incessant theme in Primary meetings in 2002 was “Follow the Prophet”; I do not
recall any “sharing time” discussions of conscience. We did regularly sing “I Am a Child of God,”
and we recited and sang the “We Believe” of the Articles of Faith.
19. For an eloquent and profound contemporary statement on the importance of conscience,
see Pope John Paul II, Veritatis splendor [The Splendor of Truth], Papal Encyclical, (Aug. 6, 1993),
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/
documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html.
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had recognized the importance of conscience and had even taught that if
confronted with a conflict between conscience and church teaching, an
individual must follow his conscience.20 Still, Catholic teaching had not
left the individual alone with just his conscience and God, but had
interposed a host of aids to instruct and influence the believer: church
authorities, the sacraments, and centuries of accumulated Christian
tradition. To some Protestants, these mediating materials represented an
interference with conscience.
The basic proposition was expressed in a tract by the New England
Protestant minister and legislator, Elisha Williams, who wrote in A
Seasonable Plea for the Liberty of Conscience and the Right of Private
Judgment in Matters of Religion, Without any Controul from Human
Authority, that
To submit our Consciences to the Guidance of any Man, or Order of
Men is not to reason and act according to our own Understanding . . . .
And in every Instance wherein we thus submit our selves to the
Direction of any humane Authority, so far we set aside and renounce all
other Authority, our own Light and Reason, and even the Word of God
and Christ . . . . And therefore if our Consciences are under the
Direction of any humane Authority as to religious Matters; they cease
to be under the Direction of CHRIST.21

Now I think we can see the appeal but also the dangers implicit in
this position. We can agree, I suppose, that a degree of individual
independence from both state and church is a good thing: we do not want
individuals to be completely subordinated to, or absorbed into, either
state or church, like cells in the human body. The merit of claims of
conscience is that they remind us that, ultimately, it is individuals⎯not
collectives⎯who believe and hope and love and are saved. The point is
obvious, perhaps, but also easily forgotten, especially when the demands
of solidarity are strong. And if conscience were infallible, if it were
always the authentic voice of God speaking within us, then I suppose we
would not need to worry about its more radical tendencies. But
conscience, or what people take to be the voice of conscience, is not
infallible; outlandish doctrines and wicked deeds have often been

20. Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
WESTERN THOUGHT 29, 36−38 (Noel B. Reynolds & W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 1996).
21. ELISHA WILLIAMS, A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR THE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE AND THE
RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL FROM HUMAN
AUTHORITY 12−13 (Boston, S. Kneeland & T. Green 1744).
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perpetrated, sincerely, in the name of conscience. Unchecked, conscience
would threaten anarchy: civil anarchy if conscience is set up against the
state, religious anarchy if conscience is set up against the church.
Perhaps more importantly, a single-minded reliance on
conscience⎯and the consequent rejection of authority⎯threatens to
leave the individual without reliable guidance or moorings. The fact is
that God rarely if ever speaks to the believer directly and in a vacuum.
His teachings come to us, usually, through the media of scripture and
tradition and church. Even in Joseph Smith’s accounts of direct heavenly
visitations, the visitors speak in an inherited language; they typically use
that language to quote scripture, and they implicitly rely on a host of
concepts and understandings built up through centuries of Christian
tradition. Without that tradition, it is hard to see how Joseph could even
have conceived and asked the questions he posed, much less received or
understood answers to those questions.
In reading the heart-felt fulminations of an Elisha Williams against
those who would allow anything to mediate between the individual and
God, we are tempted to ask how the independence for which Williams
pleads could even be possible. What is the Bible itself, which Williams
offers as the definitive and only guide,22 if not a sort of intermediary,
collected and passed on by the Christian community, between God and
us? What is Williams doing when he preaches sermons if not mediating,
in a sense, between God and the congregation? Indeed, it would not be
much of an exaggeration to say that the modern, debased conception of
conscience is the culmination of notions like Williams’s: there is a sort of
natural progression from Williams’s “right of private judgment”23 to
Thomas Paine’s “My own mind is my own church”24 to a notion of
conscience as simply “personal existential decision making.”25
We can perhaps notice the risks implicit in conscience in Oliver
Cowdery’s own life. Professor Smith in James Madison, John
Witherspoon, and Oliver Cowdery: The First Amendment and the 134th
Section of the Doctrine and Covenants spends several pages discussing
the circumstances of Oliver’s excommunication.26 His typically good22. Id. at 1 (asserting that “the Sacred Scriptures are the alone Rule of Faith and Practice to a
Christian”).
23. See id.
24. 1 THOMAS PAINE, Age of Reason, in THE COMPLETE RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL
WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 5, 6 (New York, Peter Eckler 1892).
25. See Failinger, supra note 14, at 94.
26. See Smith, supra note 1, at text accompanying notes 107−18.
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hearted effort to give the kindest possible portrayal to all the
characters⎯Oliver, Joseph, and the LDS Church in general⎯perhaps
inclines to elevate faith-enhancing charity over a cruder credibility, and
in doing so it forbears from noticing what we might call the dark side of
conscience. Oliver disagreed with the church leadership over a fairly
wide range of matters, but I think it would be fair to say that on the only
point of disagreement specifically referred to in Professor Smith’s
paper⎯that is, a dispute over property⎯Oliver’s position seems a bit
bizarre.
As Professor Smith explains, Oliver had been accused of “virtually
denying the faith by declaring that he would not be governed by any
ecclesiastical authority or revelations whatever, in his temporal affairs,”
and also for “selling his lands in Jackson County, contrary to the
revelations.”27 In his response, Oliver got into a discussion of whether
land in this country is “allodial” or subject to “feudal tenures.” He
asserted the rights of property ownership under English and American
law and also alluded to principles of religious liberty and church-state
separation. Then from these assorted legal propositions he somehow
drew the conclusion that the Church was acting wrongly or beyond its
authority by giving direction in these matters.28
Oliver asserted other grievances (including a complaint about what
we might now describe as the circumstances surrounding the origins of
polygamy), and I admit to being in sympathy with some of Oliver’s
concerns. Even from a distance, though, I think we can say that on this
specific issue of property, Oliver seemed confused. Why would he think
that civil law governing property ownership would mean that a church
cannot impose conditions or regulations on its members? Why would the
fact that in this country property is allodial rather than feudal (whatever
that means) preclude a church from giving direction to those who choose
to belong to it, even in temporal affairs?
Reading Oliver’s letter, we are tempted to say that a little legal
learning is a dangerous thing.29 However, the danger lies not just in legal

27. See
The
Oliver
Cowdery
Pages,
at
http://OliverCowdery.com/history/
Cdryhst2.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
28. Id. I admit that I know none of the details of the Oliver Cowdery controversy.
29. The dangerousness of a little legal learning might help explain, by the way, why Oliver’s
decision to practice law also figured in the Church’s accusations against him. The first charge
asserted that Oliver was instituting a “vexatious lawsuit,” and the seventh charge accused him of
“leaving his calling to which God had appointed him by revelation, for the sake of filthy lucre, and
turning to the practice of law.” Id.
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learning but also in a commitment to the primacy of conscience, because
Oliver’s dubious conclusions seem to have been closely interwoven with
his understanding of conscience. Thus, immediately after his invocation
of principles of religious freedom, he asserted that “[t]his attempt to
control me in my temporal interests, I conceive to be a disposition to take
from me a portion of my Constitutional privileges and inherent right.” It
was an effort, he said, to which “I cannot in conscience subscribe . . . .”30
The context and specific controversy were different, but in the
background you can almost hear the distant voices of Elisha Williams
and Thomas Paine.
A full account of Oliver Cowdery’s understanding of conscience
would need to consider not only the general edifying declarations of
section 134 of the Doctrine & Covenants but also the more disruptive
conception of conscience at work in Oliver’s later controversy with the
Church. The fuller account might teach us not only about the value of
conscience but also about the limits of conscience, and about the
delicate, difficult task of reconciling the potentially atomistic claims of
conscience with the imperatives of community and authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the centuries, the task of reconciling the claims of conscience
with the imperatives of community and authority is one with which
governments and Christians, including latter-day Christians, have
struggled. With benefit of hindsight, we may be inclined to conclude that
at times collective needs and pressures have dominated the just claims of
conscience; at other times individualist assertions of independence have
overrun the legitimate values of community. In our own time, I believe
we can see, depending on where and how we look, evidence of both
kinds of imbalance. My suggestion is that LDS teachings and history
should serve to make us aware of both the sacred value and the perils of
conscience, in a way that might give us a valuable perspective to bring to
the law.

30. Id. (emphasis added).
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